University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Finance Faculty Publications

Finance

3-2010

Real Options Analysis and the Assumptions of
Corporate Finance: A Non-Technical Review
Tom Arnold
University of Richmond, tarnold@richmond.edu

Richard L. Shockley Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/finance-faculty-publications
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons
Recommended Citation
Arnold, Tom, and Richard L. Shockley, Jr. "Real Options Analysis and the Assumptions of Corporate Finance: A Non-Technical
Review*." Multinational Finance Journal 14, no. 1/2 (March/June 2010): 29-71.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Finance at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Finance
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

1

Real Options Analysis and the Assumptions of
Corporate Finance:
A Non-Technical Review*
Tom Arnold
University of Richmond, USA

Richard L. Shockley, Jr.
Indiana University, USA

This paper provides a non-technical presentation of the theoretical
foundations of corporate financial decision making and the net present value
(NPV) rule. Our objective is to show that the concepts of value and value
creation arise from a single, unified framework that is firmly rooted in
neoclassical microeconomic theory. This, in turn, allow us to demonstrate that
the corporate valuation approach generically known as real options analysis is
perfectly justifiable – without further qualification – in any situation when
investors want managers to maximize NPV.
Key words: NPV, real options analysis, arbitrage, fundamental theorem of asset
pricing

I. Introduction
This paper provides a non-technical presentation of the theoretical
foundations of corporate financial decision making and the net present
value (NPV) rule. Our objective is to show that the concepts of value
and value creation arise from a single, unified framework that is firmly
rooted in neoclassical microeconomic theory. This, in turn, allow us to
demonstrate that the corporate valuation approach generically known as
real options analysis is perfectly justifiable – without further
* The authors thank Mike Ferguson, Scott Smart, and an anonymous referee for very
helpful comments.
(Multinational Finance Journal, 2010, vol. 14, no. 1/2, pp. 29–71)
© Multinational Finance Society, a nonprofit corporation. All rights reserved.
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qualification – in any situation when investors want managers to
maximize NPV.
A common objection to real options analysis is that option pricing
models require certain assumptions that are not met in real asset
markets. For example, one often hears the ritual protest that options on
real assets cannot be priced because the real asset is not traded, and
hence cannot be held in a “tracking portfolio”. We’ll show that this
objection is completely unfounded in any situation where discounted
cash flow (DCF) can be applied: as long as a manager is willing to
make the assumptions necessary for valuation of an illiquid asset using
DCF, then the manager has already made assumptions that are
sufficiently strong to price options on that asset even though the real
asset itself is not traded.
To put it another way, rejection of real options analysis in a
corporate setting based on the illiquidity of the project implies rejection
of DCF for valuation of that project as well. DCF and real options
analysis are simply two alternative (but theoretically equivalent)
mechanical approaches to valuation of a corporate asset.
But the story is even deeper. In spite of what many practitioners and
academics believe, the NPV rule for corporate decision-making is not an
axiom or fundamental truth, but rather is the result of an economic
construction that relies on several critical assumptions. As it turns out,
the assumptions required for the appropriateness of both DCF and real
options analysis are necessary conditions for the NPV rule to be the
appropriate managerial benchmark. In other words, rejection of real
options analysis in a corporate setting based on the illiquidity of the
project implies rejection of NPV as the manager’s guiding principle.1
As the reader will soon see, our review will require a synthesis of
two streams of finance theory literature. The first is the modern theory
of asset pricing, which stems directly from the neoclassical portfolio
choice problem. This body of theory gives us the framework for the
mechanics of valuation in financial markets. The second, which is
known as the “unanimity” literature, examines the objectives of
corporate managers who make real asset decisions on the behalf of their
investors. This body of theory tells us the conditions under which the
investors want the managers to use financial market valuation
mechanics in order to evaluate new opportunities (that is, the standard
1. On the other hand, the conditions required for maximization of NPV to be the desired
goal of management are sufficient conditions for both DCF and option pricing to be
appropriate valuation techniques. So acceptance of the NPV rule (as usually defined) is, by
logical force, acceptance of the appropriateness of real options analysis.
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NPV rule).
We’ll actually tackle these in reverse order, but first we will need to
supply some foundational material. Section II presents some basic
definitions and a key result that provides the common motif known as
linear pricing. Then, in Section III, we proffer a general summary of
corporate finance and capital budgeting. The main point of Section III
is a clear statement of the unanimity result – the conditions under which
the appropriate goal of management is maximization of shareholder
value. The notion of shareholder value requires an understanding of
valuation in the capital markets, and we turn to this issue in Section IV.
In this part of the paper, we provide an extended (though
straightforward) example of linear pricing and we lay bare some of the
simplifying shortcuts we usually take in the classroom. Only when the
big shortcuts are removed can we show that DCF and real options
valuation are really the same – they are both applications of the linear
pricing result. We then demonstrate, for the interested academic reader,
that one can express the linear pricing approach in several different (but
absolutely equivalent) ways. Section V concludes the paper with a
summary.

II. Fundamentals
Economists describe a risky world as one in which there are many
possible future states of nature. A state of nature is a particular possible
future realization of aggregate consumption at a particular point in time;
that is, it is a potential macroeconomic outcome.2 For teaching
purposes, it is useful to simplify things by assuming that there are a
small number of future states at only one future point in time; the
intuition carries over easily to a large number of states at many future
points in time. So for example, consider a world where there are only
two macroeconomic outcomes that can possibly occur one year from
today: the economy booms, or the economy busts. The “boom” and
“bust” economies are the two future states of nature, one of which will
actually occur.
A useful abstraction is to consider units of consumption (or
equivalently “cash flow”) in different states of nature at various future
points in time to be different goods. In other words, a unit of
consumption (or cash flow) in the boom state is a different good from
2. The results we describe require the state space to be of finite dimension.
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a unit of consumption (or cash flow) in the bust state.
A security is a financial asset completely characterized by its future
state-contingent cash flows. For example, consider the securities X, Y
and Z whose current prices and future state-contingent cash flows we
present in the table below.

Current Prices
X
Y
Z
Current Prices: 10
9
?
State-Contingent Cash Flows
Subj.Prob. Future Macro State
X
Y
Z
0.5
0.5

Boom
Bust

20
5

10
10

30
0

Securities X and Z are risky financial assets, because each has future
cash flows that vary across macroeconomic states. Security Y, on the
other hand, is riskless. The cash flows on the securities come from real
assets, which are the economy’s primitive assets (be they tangible or
intangible). Securities are claims on the cash flows of real assets (in one
way or another), and the financial market is the hypothetical “place”
where these securities trade. Individual agents select their securities for
investment by solving the portfolio choice problem.
Portfolio Choice Problem: choose portfolio holdings of securities
and levels of current and future state-contingent consumption to
maximize utility of consumption, subject to two conditions: (1) that
the state-contingent portfolio payoffs achieved by the portfolio
holdings equal the desired state-contingent consumption levels, and
(2) that current consumption plus current investment in securities
equals current endowment (or wealth).
The portfolio problem’s general results we utilize in this paper are
called preference free, which means that they do not rely on any specific
assumptions about our agents’ utility of consumption (except that all
agents prefer more to less). When we get to our examples later in the
paper, we will impose further restrictions on utility; however, we wish
to assure the reader that these specifications will be inconsequential to
the general results.
The single concept that unifies all of finance is the notion of an
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arbitrage opportunity. An arbitrage opportunity is a portfolio change
that would make all agents who prefer more to less strictly better off.
While there are many taxonomies of arbitrage opportunities, they all
involve simultaneous purchase and short sale of securities such that the
arbitrageur achieves positive returns with no risk whatsoever to his or
her endowment.3
Absence of arbitrage is a critical feature of an extremely important
result in finance – a result so fundamental, in fact, that it is called the
Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing.
Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing:4 The following conditions
are equivalent:
(1) There exists at least one agent in the economy who prefers more
to less and who has an optimum solution to the portfolio choice
problem.
(2) The financial market provides no arbitrage opportunities.
(3) There exists a positive linear pricing rule which correctly values
all financial market assets.
The term “positive linear pricing rule” is a somewhat abstract
construct that we’ll pin down more carefully in section IV. However, we
can say at this juncture that the positive linear pricing rule is just a
valuation concept that can be expressed in a variety of absolutely
equivalent ways – some of which are very familiar. The essential point
for us is the term linear: if the future state-contingent cash flows on a
security are linearly related to the future state-contingent cash flows on
any other portfolio of securities, then the price of the first asset must be
linearly related to the prices of the securities in the other portfolio.
If there are no arbitrage opportunities in our simplified financial
market with securities X, Y and Z, we can exploit the Fundamental
Theorem to find the current market value of Z. Though there are many
ways to do this, we’ll demonstrate it with two common approaches.
We’ll illustrate several other approaches in section IV.

3. One example of an arbitrage opportunity would be a strategy that achieves an
immediate cash inflow with no possibility of any future cash inflows or outflows; another
example would be a strategy with no immediate cash inflow or outflow but with non-negative
cash flows in all future states (and with strictly positive cash flow in at least one).
4. The interested reader can find an accessible proof in Dybvig and Ross (1987, 2003).
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A. Approach #1
It is easy to verify that in both the “boom” and “bust” economies, the
cash flow on security Z is equal to two times the cash flow on security
X minus one times the cash flow on security Y; therefore, the linear
relationship is Z = 2Y – 1X. So it must be that the current price of Z
equals two times the price of X minus one time the price of Y, or Z = 2X
– 1Y = 2(10) – 1(9) = 11. The price of Z must be 11, else there is an
arbitrage opportunity: if the market price of Z is less than 11, then one
can create a “free lunch” by buying 1 Z, selling 2 X, and buying 1Y; if
the price of Z is greater than 11, sell 1 Z, buy 2 X and sell 1 Y. Approach
#1 illustrates what many people call a tracking portfolio approach to
valuation: one can “track” an investment in Z with a portfolio that is
long 2 units of X and short 1 unit of Y, so the value of Z must be equal
to the value of this tracking portfolio. Practitioners generally associate
the tracking portfolio approach with the valuation of derivatives, and
indeed this is usually the first derivatives pricing method presented to
students.5
B. Approach #2
We can also demonstrate linear pricing using rates of return. A portfolio
with w% invested in security X and the rest in security Y earns the
state-contingent return w ⋅ rX + (1 − w ) ⋅ rY . So if there’s a linear
relationship between the returns on Z and the returns on a portfolio of
X and Y, then it will be expressed by the following simultaneous
equations:

rZ ( Boom ) = w ⋅ rX ( Boom ) + (1 − w ) ⋅ rY ( Boom )
rZ ( Bust ) = w ⋅ rX ( Bust ) + (1 − w ) ⋅ rY ( Bust )
Filling in what we know (or can calculate) from the table above makes
the simultaneous equations look like this:

30
− 1 = w ⋅ 100% + (1 − w ) ⋅ 11.11%
PZ

5. In this case, security Z could be interpreted as 3 calls on X with a strike price of 10.
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0
− 1 = w ⋅ −50% + (1 − w ) ⋅ 11.11%
PZ
These are two equations in two unknowns: PZ (the price of Z) and w. It
is straightforward to solve these, and the reader can verify that w =
181.82% and PZ = 11. Of course this is the same price we got in
approach #1, but you should also notice that 181.82% is the “weight”
of security X in the tracking portfolio from approach #1. In fact, we
could exploit this to show a more familiar approach to valuation. If the
return on Z in both possible states of nature is equal to 1.8182 times the
return on X minus 0.8182 times the return on Y, then the expected (or
probability-weighted) return on Z must be 1.8182 times the expected
return on X minus 0.8182 times the expected return on Y. Since the
expected returns on X and Y are 25% and 11.11%, respectively, then the
expected return on Z must be

rZ = 1.8182 ⋅ rX + 0.8182 ⋅ rY
= 1.8182 ⋅ 25% + 0.8182 ⋅ 11.11%
= 36.36%
Since the expected return on Z must be 36.36%, its price today must be
set such that its expected value in the future is 36.36% higher, or

PZ (1 + rZ ) = E {CFZ }
PZ =

E {CFZ }
(1 + rZ )

In our problem

PZ =

0.5 × 30 + 0.5 × 0
15
=
1 + 36.36%
1.3636

PZ = 11
Even the novice reader will recognize this as valuation by discounted
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cash flow. The DCF model is nothing more than an application of linear
pricing.
It may seem to be something of a tautology, in that we had to solve
for the price of Z before we could find its required rate of return for the
DCF valuation. But this is precisely what goes on when we do DCF.
The practical approach is to estimate the required rate of return on an
asset, and then use that return in the DCF model to value the asset.
To estimate required rates of return for DCF, we turn to what are
called asset pricing models (such as the CAPM or APT). A key goal of
any asset pricing model is to provide the practitioner with a way of
estimating the required rate of return on a new asset without explicitly
forming the tracking portfolio or solving the simultaneous return
equations. Of course, models are simplifications that require
assumptions, and in order to implement linear pricing via an asset
pricing model we need to place restrictive conditions on the world.
The point here is that DCF is absolutely equivalent in theory to
“textbook” option pricing techniques, in that both are applications of
linear pricing. In the next section, we explore the conditions under
which a firm’s investors unanimously desire that the firm’s managers
apply linear pricing techniques (whatever they may be) to new corporate
investment opportunities.

III. Corporate Finance, Capital Budgeting, and Unanimity
The firm and its managers occupy a position between the real asset
market (the market for new, specialized projects) and the financial asset
market. Investors provide capital to firms because firms have special
features that give them unique access to assets in the real asset market.

Real
Asset
Market

⇔

Firm and
Investors

⇔

Financial
Asset
Market

When a new corporate opportunity arises, valuation of the opportunity
proceeds by asking the following question: if we adopt the (illiquid)
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Real
Asset
Market

Cash Investment
Now
= PV of Outflows

Firm and
Investors

Value of Claims on
Cash Flow Now
= PV of Inflows

Financial
Asset
Market

Risky Future Cash Flows

FIGURE 1.
new project and immediately sell the financial claims on the project’s
cash flows into the (liquid) financial markets, what price would we
receive for those claims? The present value of the free cash flows from
a project is actually the value that the capital markets would pay for
those claims immediately. The NPV is the difference between the price
actually paid for the new real assets (the PV of the investment) and the
price that could be received in the financial market for the claims on its
cash flows (the PV of the inflows).
This illustrates why value grows when managers invest in positive
NPV projects. It also illustrates why positive NPV leads to shareholder
value maximization: by investing in positive NPV projects, the existing
shareholders capture the gain. Finally, it illustrates the procedure: we
look to the financial markets to see how they currently value the risky
future cash flows on a project, and compare that value to our actual cost
of ‘buying’ the cash flows in the illiquid real asset market.6
While this is the right intuition behind corporate capital budgeting,
we’ve left out a very important piece of information. Specifically, we
have not characterized the economic situation in which shareholders
actually want managers to behave this way. It is no wonder that so many
people take the NPV rule and shareholder wealth maximization to be
axioms of finance – most finance educators (including the authors)
present the procedure above as if it were handed to us by some higher
authority.
The critical question is this: under what conditions do shareholders
unanimously want managers to
(1) Observe the prices of existing financial assets;
6. The fact that managers don’t actually sell cash flows from every new project to the
financial markets is irrelevant. Using internally generated cash flow to fund a project is
equivalent to selling those new cash flows to the existing equityholders, who capture the NPV
regardless. The existing shareholders only care that the amount invested by the firm is less
than the value of the risky cash flows if they were sold to the financial markets.
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(2) Use a linear pricing approach (whatever it may be) to calculate
the value of a new investment opportunity as a linear combination
of existing financial market securities; and
(3) Accept those new opportunities in which the value of the new
opportunity (as described in step 2) is greater than the cost of the
investment (that is, opportunities that display positive NPV)?
This question is the subject of what is known in finance as the
unanimity literature. As it turns out, the conditions for unanimity (that
is, the unanimous desire among shareholders for the NPV rule) are
(A) The financial markets must be free of arbitrage opportunities.
This ensures that the cash flows from the new investment
opportunity would have the same value as the linear combination of
traded securities that replicates (i.e., tracks) the new investment
opportunity’s cash flows (via the Fundamental Theorem); and
(B) Managers act as price takers. In other words, managers do not
consider the effects of the new investment opportunity on the prices
of financial market securities. For the new investment to have no
effect on existing security prices, two conditions must be met.
(a) The financial markets must be sufficiently complete. In other
words, the cash flows thrown off by the new investment
opportunity must be replicable by some portfolio of traded
financial securities.
(b) The new investment must not change aggregate consumption
in a material way.
In the unanimity literature, the price-taking assumption is often
called the competitivity assumption. Its importance should not be
underestimated. If the financial market is not sufficiently complete (that
is, if the cash flows from the new project are not a linear combination
of the cash flows of existing securities), then the cash flow stream from
the new corporate project will provide investors with previously
unattainable future consumption patterns and hence potentially change
their optimum portfolios. As a direct result, financial market prices
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would change and managers would not be price takers. If the new
opportunity changes aggregate consumption in a material way, then its
adoption will change the prices of all existing assets in the economy
even if the market is complete. This happens because discount rates
implicit in market prices depend crucially on the levels of current and
future endowments. If a new opportunity changes future endowments,
then equilibrium prices (and hence discount rates) change and managers
will not be price takers.
In a nutshell, the price taking assumption requires that
pre-investment financial market prices do not change due to the new
investment – so managers can use the pre-investment linear pricing rule
to evaluate the post-investment wealth effects of their decisions. If
managers do not act as price takers, then the textbook NPV rule is not
what investors want managers to use. Rather, we are left with a
procedure derived by Grossman and Hart (1979): managers should
provide each investor with relevant information about the project; each
investor should calculate their own change in utility due to the
investment by forecasting what will happen to the financial market
equilibrium; and managers should then weight each of these
assessments by each investor’s relative ownership in the firm. Needless
to say, this approach is not easy to implement.
In summary, the whole procedure of corporate capital budgeting
rests on figuring out what the risky cash flows of a new project are
currently worth in the financial markets. Once we assume no arbitrage
in financial markets and price taking by managers (which we must do
in order to adopt shareholder wealth maximization as the proper goal of
the firm), we can use any linear pricing approach to attach values to
new, illiquid investments. DCF and option pricing are equally valid,
regardless of the illiquidity of the new opportunity. That’s the entire
point of this article.
To reiterate, all linear pricing techniques are appropriate for valuing
illiquid corporate investments as long as maximization of shareholder
wealth is taken as the goal of the firm. Our next objectives are to clarify
the finance notion of valuation in the capital markets, to further
illustrate that DCF is an linear pricing technique (just like option
pricing), and to demonstrate that tracking portfolios for use in linear
pricing need not involve positions in the illiquid “underlying” asset.
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IV. Valuation in the Capital Markets
A substantial amount of misunderstanding about option pricing arises
because of the shortcuts we take when we teach the basics of DCF
valuation. Our goal in this section is to set the record straight on this
matter. In order to do this, we’ll have to proceed in the textbook fashion,
point out the shortcuts along the way, and then re-proffer the model in
a more complete form. We will use some numerical examples to help
make our point.
The standard textbook approach is to present a one-period economy
in which individuals can trade current consumption for future
consumption. This setup, originally presented in Fisher (1907, 1930), is
used to motivate both risk-adjusted discounting and the notion that firms
should behave like investors (Fisher’s “separation” result).
A. The Green Acres Economy
Let’s consider the simplest possible model of risk. The community of
Hooterville is a hamlet of N individuals who are identical in
preferences, tastes, endowments and beliefs about the future. The
residents of Hooterville are farmers, and because of the geography of
the local area, the only crop is corn. Furthermore, the people of
Hooterville are completely isolated from the outside world. Hence, the
only consumptive commodity is corn; the residents can consume only
what they produce, no more and no less.
To keep things simple, suppose that the Hooterville economy lasts
only one year, and at the end of the year the individuals share equally
in the (random) output of the year’s crop. In other words, all N
individuals have identical contingent claims on the crop at the end of the
year: 200 bushels of corn if there is a banner crop (ybanner= 200) but only
80 bushels if the crop is poor (ypoor= 80). Moreover, all of the
individuals agree that ‘banner’ and ‘poor’ harvests are equally likely:
πbanner = πpoor = 0.5.
Each individual is endowed with 100 bushels of ‘present’ corn ( y0
= 100). Hooterville is a pure-exchange economy, so it is impossible for
the residents to change their endowments by planting more/less or
storing; however, they can change their consumption patterns by
trading. Trading takes place at Sam Drucker’s general store. Drucker’s
market allows the residents to alter their consumption across time: those
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wishing to consume more than 100 bushels of corn today may sell their
future corn endowment, while those with extra corn today may purchase
more future corn.
We reiterate that Hooterville is a pure-exchange economy – there is
no investment and storage is not allowed (that is, the corn is perishable).
So the total current crop (100 bushels of corn times N individuals =
100N bushels) must be consumed today. Similarly, the entire future
crop, whatever it may be, must be consumed at the end of the period.
The expected crop is 0.5x200 bushels + 0.5x80 bushels = 140
bushels per person, times N individuals = 140N bushels. Individuals
may trade current consumption for claims on future consumption so that
some individuals may consume more than their endowments today
while others consume less, but across the entire economy the
consumption today must be 100N bushels, and the expected
consumption at the end of the year must be 140N bushels (total
consumption will be 200N bushels of corn if the ‘banner’ crop appears
and 80N bushels if the ‘poor’ crop appears, regardless of the trades
made).
Finally, we raise one caveat. In the following examples, we will
derive a financial market equilibrium and then use the equilibrium
prices of securities to price new trades between the Hooterville
residents. Technically, the economy’s linear pricing rule will correctly
value only marginal trades and not large ones. The trades we will
evaluate will represent large fractions of each individual’s endowment.
We take this very common shortcut for ease of presentation, and we
thank an anonymous referee for stressing the importance of this issue.
B. The ‘Textbook’ Presentation – The World of Certainty
Virtually every Corporate Finance textbook begins with a chapter (often
skipped by instructors), which demonstrates that individuals can use
financial markets like Drucker’s store to adjust their patterns of
consumption over time. The ultimate point of such a chapter is to show
that financial markets can provide a benchmark for investment
decisions, and this in turn serves as the introduction to discounted cash
flow and the NPV rule.
For the sake of pedagogy, textbook authors take a shortcut: the
intertemporal model with risk (where the future crop is uncertain, as
described above) is simplified into a world of certainty (the future crop
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is known). This simplified sort of presentation works well to provide
a motivation for the NPV rule, but the insight about NPV gained through
the simplification comes at a pedagogical cost: it becomes much more
difficult to explain to students what it means for projects to have
different risks. Moreover, in a world of certainty there are no options
– and the certainty leads many of us (the authors included) to make
option pricing appear to be quite different from DCF.
In Hooterville, the shortcut changes the problem from one where the
future harvest could be banner or poor to one where the certain crop is
used as a substitute. In other words, any distinction between the welfare
of the population in the banner-crop state and in the poor-crop state is
completely lost. This turns out to be extremely important, because risk
is really a function of how payoffs differ across different
macroeconomic states.7
So instead of the future crop being random, we take the shortcut
assumption that the future crop will be 140. We maintain the
assumption about current endowments, and specify that utility of
consumption is given by

U = ln ( c0 ⋅ c1 ) = ln c0 + ln c1
It is easy to derive the equilibrium price that must arise at Drucker’s
market for the single market exchange: every 1 additional bushel of
corn in the future costs 0.714 bushels of corn today. To put it another
way, one bushel of present corn will bring 1.40 bushels of future corn
in exchange. Individuals who wish to give up present consumption can
give up one bushel of corn today and get back 1.40 in the future;
individuals who wish to consume against future wealth can get 1
additional bushel of corn today by sacrificing 1.40 bushels in the
future.8
The typical corporate finance textbook uses the following graphical
depiction of the intertermporal consumption opportunities available
through trading at Drucker’s market.
7. For example, a 100-bushel loan to a resident of Hooterville differs in risk from a
20-bushel loan, because the small loan could always be repaid from future crop whereas the
large loan defaults in the poor-crop state. The standard textbook treatment provides no
distinction between the two because the future is collapsed to one state (a crop of 140); thus,
both loans are incorrectly treated as having the same risk.
8. The derivation of the pure exchange equilibrium is given in the appendix.
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Consumption
In Future
280
(140 + 100x1.40)

B

A

140

Market Opportunity
Line
C
100

Consumption
Today

200
(100 + 140x0.714)

FIGURE 2.
In figure above, the point A is the initial endowment of Alf Monroe,
a representative resident of Hooterville who (in partnership with his
sister Ralph) provides carpentry services as a hobby. The horizontal
axis presents Alf’s current consumption of corn, and the vertical axis
measures his future consumption of corn. The line that connects the
two axes is the market opportunity line which represents all of the
possible baskets of current and future consumption that Alf could
achieve by trading in the market at Sam Drucker’s; the slope of the
market opportunity line represents, in equilibrium, how much current
corn the residents of Hooterville are willing to give up in order to get
one additional unit of future corn.
Point B on the chart represents the maximum amount of corn Alf
could consume in the future by selling away (or lending) all 100 bushels
of his current endowment of corn at the market price (140 of future
endowment plus 100*(1.40) of return on the loan of the current
endowment). Point C represents the maximum amount of corn Alf
could consume immediately by buying against his future endowment (or
borrowing), which is 100 bushels of current endowment plus
140*(0.714) current price of future endowment.
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We stress the point that even though this is a pure-exchange
economy, there is a market rate of interest. An interest rate is simply the
price of consumption in a future period relative to the price of
consumption in an earlier period. Here, the market rate of interest is the
equilibrium marginal rate of substitution between consumption of corn
today and in the future. So even though the residents of Hooterville
can’t save or invest, they can use Drucker’s market to observe the
equilibrium interest rate and to trade claims on future consumption for
claims on current consumption. Mathematically, the equilibrium rate of
corn interest in Hooterville is

−1 ⋅ ( slope of market opportunity line ) = (1 + rate of return )
so

rcorn = 40%
Armed with this information, Alf can examine any other opportunities
that might arise. For example, suppose that one afternoon, Alf’s sister
Ralph offers to sell to Alf exactly one-fourth of her future corn
endowment in exchange for 35 bushels of Alf’s current endowment.
Alf examines this opportunity in the following way. One-fourth of
Ralph’s future endowment is 0.25*140 = 35, so if Alf takes the deal he
must give up 35 bushels of corn today in exchange for 35 in the future.
Alf can evaluate this deal in several ways.
First, Alf might evaluate the deal graphically. The figure below
reproduces Alf’s market opportunity line from above and superimposes
his augmented endowment after taking Ralph’s proposal (point R) as
well as his augmented market opportunity line given that he takes
Ralph’s proposal.
Clearly, Ralph’s deal makes Alf poorer. In terms of maximum
possible current consumption, Ralph’s deal makes Alf strictly worse off
by 10 bushels of corn. In terms of maximum possible future
consumption, Ralph’s deal makes Alf strictly worse off by 14 bushels
of corn. It should not be surprising that 14/1.40 = 10.
A second way for Alf to analyze Ralph’s deal would be to ask the
question slightly differently. Suppose that Alf were to go to Drucker’s
market and find a way to replicate Ralph’s deal by trading. Ralph’s deal
promises 35 in the future and costs 35 today. If Alf can buy 35 bushels
of future corn at Drucker’s, how much more or less than Ralph’s price
would it cost?
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Consumption
In Future
280 B
266
A

175
R

65

Market Opportunity
Without Deal
With Deal
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Consumption
Today

FIGURE 3.
At Drucker’s, Alf can purchase 35 bushels of future corn at a price
of 0.714 bushels of current corn each, or for a total price of 35 * 0.714
= 25. So, the same deal in the financial markets costs Alf 10 bushels of
current corn less than the price Ralph is asking.
What this tells us is that the arbitrage-free price of Ralph’s deal is 25
bushels of current corn. If Alf could sell the deal to Ralph instead of
purchasing it, Alf could turn Ralph into a money pump. Of course, Alf
himself becomes the money pump if he accepts the deal, because Ralph
could immediately undo the deal at Drucker’s and realize the arbitrage
profit:

Ralph's Payoffs

Today Future

Sell Deal to Alf
35
Buy 35 Bushels Future Corn at Drucker's @0.714 − 25
Ralph's Arbitrage Profit
10

− 35
35
0
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A third way for Alf to evaluate Ralph’s proposal would be through a
DCF analysis (discounted corn flow), and application of the NPV rule.
Since the rate of return on corn in this market is 40%, the present value
of Ralph’s promised future corn flow is

PV ( 35 bushels received in one year ) =

35
35
=
= 25
1 + r 1.40

Since the cost of entering Ralph’s deal is 35, then the NPV of Ralph’s
deal is

NPV ( Ralph ' s Deal ) = PV ( Corn Inflows ) − Investment
=

35
− 35 = −10
1.40

Two things should be noted here. First of all, the NPV calculation gives
us the exact wealth loss to Alf (–10) that we calculated from both the
graphical analysis as well as the arbitrage analysis. More importantly,
perhaps, is the fact that the “present value of the corn inflows”
calculation gave us a value of 25 – which is exactly equal to the
arbitrage-free value of the future corn flows in the financial market.
That is, the PV of the inflows is the financial market price of those
flows. Why is this? Because the DCF analysis is actually an equivalent
approach to linear pricing – the discount rate used is the rate of return
that can be earned on the tracking that exactly mimics the new
opportunity (like approach #1 in the earlier section). In this case, the
tracking portfolio that exactly mimics Ralph’s deal is a long position in
35 bushels of future corn. Since the current price of this contract would
be 35*(0.714) = 25, the rate of return on the arbitrage portfolio is(35/25
– 1) = 40% and discounting at 40% gives the arbitrage-free value of the
deal. DCF valuation is an application of linear pricing, and NPV
measures how much better or worse off the investor (Alf) becomes
relative to buying the same deal in the financial markets.
C. But Where Do Firms Fit In?
Fisher (1907,1930) extended the world of certainty to include
production by firms. For example, the residents of Hooterville actually
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have a choice of what to do with this year’s corn endowment: they can
consume some of it, and they can plant the rest to change their
endowment in the future. Fisher’s very famous separation result states
quite simply that in equilibrium, productive (or firm-level) decisions do
not reflect any individual owner’s time preferences, but instead simply
act to push the market opportunity line to the right as far as possible.
Why? Because the payoffs to production are returned to the individuals,
and the individuals can exchange current and future consumption in the
financial markets to achieve their own personal optima. Hence, Fisher’s
analysis requires that agents be free to trade their claims in the financial
markets without friction.
This is the germinal analysis which gives a motivation for DCF, the
NPV rule, and the notion of shareholder value maximization. But we
stress here that Fisher’s analysis does not provide a normative rule for
what managers should do when facing a new opportunity. Rather, it
describes what happens in equilibrium (that is, the resulting prices and
decisions of the cumulated agents in the economy). Application of the
existing market prices (or rates of return) to new projects outside the
equilibrium requires further assumptions – the analysis of which is the
central point of the unanimity literature discussed above.
D. When is 40% the Correct Discount Rate?
Unfortunately, in Fisher’s world of certainty 40% is the correct discount
rate to use on any market opportunity. This is because the
certainty-based presentation of the Hooterville economy allows for no
introduction of risk, and hence all possible deals should be discounted
at this rate. You’ll frequently hear people say that “you can’t price
options via DCF”. This is actually not true – the risk-adjusted rate of
return on an option (at any given instant) is equal to the risk-adjusted
rate of return on the tracking portfolio that prices the option. The
problem with trying to value an option with DCF is that there’s no
shortcut (e.g. CAPM) way to find the risk-adjusted discount rate without
actually identifying the tracking portfolio. In option pricing, we have
to use a different approach to linear pricing.
This suggests that there are two major drawbacks to the certainty
presentation of the financial markets. The first is that it provides no way
to teach a student the true economic meaning of the term risk. The
second, which is related to the first, is that it misleads students about
how/why tracking portfolios can be formed and how/why they price
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risk. In order to demonstrate these issues more clearly, we need to
introduce uncertainty into the Fisher analysis.
E. The More Complete Presentation of the Financial Market
What we’ll show now is that the deep intuition behind both DCF and
option pricing can only be achieved from the more precise (but more
complex) multiple-state model of the financial market where risk is
explicitly recognized. If we want to examine a new proposal in
Hooterville whose payoff is truly risky, we have to introduce the notion
of multiple possible states of nature (banner crop and poor crop) and
keep track of them individually. Here we’ll set up an equilibrium and
derive the prices of current and future consumption across all future
states. This analysis was developed in Debreu (1959); the presentation
here follows Hirshleifer (1970).
We’ll maintain the assumptions given earlier (in particular, that
current endowment is 100, the banner-state crop is 200, and the
poor-state crop is 80). The one change we require is a new utility
function, as we need to correctly capture that individuals are risk-averse
across macroeconomic states. Let the utility of consumption function
for every individual be
.5
U = ln ( c0 ⋅ cbanner
⋅ c.5poor ) = ln c0 + 0.5ln cbanner + 0.5ln c poor

where c0, cbanner and cpoor represent consumption in the present, banner
and poor states (respectively). Equilibrium consumption choices will
imply a set of market-clearing prices at which individuals may trade
current corn for banner state corn and poor state corn (and to trade
banner state corn for poor state corn).
We’ll solve for prices by nominating present corn as the numeraire.
Hence, each unit of ‘present corn’ has a price of 1 ( φ0 = 1) , and we
want to solve for the price of corn in the banner state ( φbanner )and poor
state ( φpoor ) denominated in units of present corn. In the appendix, we
derive the resulting pure-exchange equilibrium and show that φbanner =
0.25 and φpoor = 0.625. What this means is that every 1 extra bushel of
corn consumption in the banner crop state costs 0.25 bushels of present
corn consumption, while every 1 extra bushel of corn in the poor crop
state costs 0.625 bushels of present corn. These are the prices of
state-contingent claims.
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We pause here to make a very important statement about the term
risk. The prices of consumption are different in the two states, even
though the likelihood of the two states are identical, because aggregate
consumption is different in the banner and poor crop states. Prices are
determined in equilibrium by marginal utility, and if agents are
risk-averse then marginal utility is high when consumption is low.
Hence, the current price of consumption in the low-endowment state
(the poor harvest) is substantially higher than the current price of
consumption in the high-endowment state (the banner harvest).9
This observation illustrates the most basic economic notion of risk:
to a consumer, the risk of a new proposal is measured by how the
proposal pays off across future macroeconomic consumption states. If
the new opportunity pays off well when aggregate consumption is high
(but not when aggregate consumption is low), then it increases the
individual’s exposure to aggregate consumption risk and hence is risky
and should be discounted severely. If, on the other hand, it pays off
well when aggregate consumption is low (but not when it is high) then
the new opportunity reduces the individual’s exposure to aggregate
consumption risk and hence is discounted at a low (or even negative)
rate.
In the world with two possible future states, the graphical analysis
has three dimensions: consumption today, consumption in the future
given the banner-crop state, and consumption in the future given the
poor-crop state.
The point E in the figure below represents the endowment of Eb
Dawson – a simple but honest handyman; the plane illustrated by the
dark black triangle represents Eb’s market opportunity set. Eb wants to
know his total wealth – that is, the total value of his current endowment
plus the market value of his future, state-contingent endowment. How
does Eb determine this amount? Well, he can simply go to the financial
market at Drucker’s and see how much others would pay today for his
future corn in each crop state. Since the price of corn in the banner state
is 0.25, Eb could sell his banner-state corn for 200*0.25 = 50 bushels of
corn today; similarly, Eb could sell his poor-state corn for 80*0.625 =
50 bushels of corn today. So the current (or present) value of Eb’s
future risky corn endowment is 50 + 50 = 100 current bushels of corn.
“Gollygee”, Eb declares to his scarecrow friend Stuffy, “My current

9. In lay terms, we’re willing to pay more for insurance against being hungry than for
insurance against being full.
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Consum ption In
Future
Poor-Crop State
240
240 =
80+
100/(0.625)

80
100
E

200

200

Consumption In
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Banner-Crop State

Consumption
Today

200 =
100 +
200*(0.25) +
80*(0.625)
600 =
200+
100/(0.25)

600

FIGURE 4.
TABLE 1.
Today

Future
‘Banner’ State

‘Poor’ State
80

Eb’s Original Endowment
Sell Future ‘Banner Crop’ Endowment
Sell Future ‘Poor Crop’ Endowment

100
50
50

200
–200

Eb’s Current Wealth

200

0

–80
0

wealth is 200 – I’ve got 100 bushels of corn in my crib, and my future
corn is worth 100 on the market”.
Notice that Eb’s valuation is just another application of linear
pricing. No matter what happens in the future, Eb’s endowment has the
same “corn flow” as a portfolio that is long 50 bushels of banner-crop
corn and long 50 bushels of poor-crop corn:
Eb’s Future Endowment = 50 x (1 bushel banner-crop corn) + 50 x
(1 bushel poor-crop corn)
Since there are no arbitrage opportunities at Drucker’s, the current
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value of Eb’s future endowment must be equal to the value of this
tracking portfolio:

State − Price Value ( Ed ' s Future Endowment ) =
50 × φBanner + 50 × φPoor
= 50 ( 0.25 ) + 50 ( 0.625 )
= 100
We use the term state–price value to describe this particular
representation of linear pricing because each security in the tracking
portfolio is a state security. It is not at all essential that actual state
securities trade at Drucker’s; rather, they may be the shadow prices for
consumption in each state which can be inferred from the market prices
of bundles that include corn flow in both states.
This leads to a second point. Since Eb can find the current value of
his future endowment of corn, then there must be an equilibrium
discount rate for an investment in corn whose risk is exactly the same
as the risk of Eb’s endowment. Since the market value of Eb’s future
expected endowment is 100, and Eb’s expected future endowment is
0.5x200 + 0.5x80 = 140 bushels of corn, the equilibrium rate of interest
(or pure rate of interest) is the rcorn that solves

DCF Value ( Ed ' s Future Endowment ) = 100 =

=

0.5 × 200 + 0.5 × 80
(1 + rcorn )

140
so rcorn = 40%
(1 + rcorn )

In other words, the risky discount rate associated with the risk of the
corn crop in this economy (which is the market rate of interest) is 40%.
Eb can use this rate of return to calculate the NPV of some new
opportunities. Suppose Arnold Ziffle offers to pay Eb 105 bushels of
corn today in exchange for Eb’s entire allocation of corn, whatever it
may be, in the future. From Eb’s perspective, the future corn flows are
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TABLE 2.
Today

Future
‘Banner’ State

‘Poor’ State
80
–80

Eb’s Original Endowment
Sell Future Endowment to Arnold Ziffle
Buy 200 bu ‘Banner’ state corn @ .25/bu
Buy 80 bu ‘Poor’ state corn @ .626/bu

100
105
–50
–50

200
–200
200

Eb’s New Wealth

105

200

80
80

negative and the current corn flow is positive, and Eb can calculate his
NPV from entering the deal as follows:

NPV ( Arnold Ziffle ' s Deal ) =

0.5 ( −200 ) + 0.5 ( −80 )
+ 105
1.40

= −100 + 105
=5
To show that the NPV is actually an arbitrage profit, note that Eb could
enter this deal with Arnold and give up his entire future consumption,
use the proceeds from the deal to repurchase his future risky endowment
in the financial market, and come out wealthier:
From Eb’s perspective, the arbitrage profit available from Arnold’s
proposal is 5. Note that this is exactly the NPV calculated above. The
NPV is simply the arbitrage profit that can be earned by “buying low
and selling high” between the financial asset market (Drucker’s) and the
real asset market (Arnold Ziffle’s pigsty).
So now suppose an enterprising individual in Hooterville proposes
a very unusual deal. Mr. Haney, an accomplished salesman, wants to
sell all but 50 bushels of his future corn endowment, no matter what
happens. In other words, he wants to assure himself 50 bushels for
consumption in either future crop-state, but he’s willing to turn over
everything else (150 bushels in the banner crop state, or 30 bushels in
the poor crop state) for 60 bushels of corn today. He approaches Oliver
Wendell Douglass, the smartest man in Hooterville: “Mr. Douglass, this
is your lucky day”.
Mr. Douglass was prepared to evaluate the deal. While attending a
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TABLE 3.
Today

Future
‘Banner’ State ‘Poor’ State

Mr. Haney’s Original Endowment
Sell all but 50 of future endowment to Douglas
Buy 150 bushels ‘Banner’ state corn @ .25/bu
Buy 30 bushels ‘Poor’ state corn @ .626/bu
Mr. Haney’s New Wealth

100
60
–37.5
–18.75

200
–150
150

103.75

200

80
–30
30
80

prestigious eastern law school, Oliver took time to audit an introductory
Finance course. He recalled from the very entertaining classes that one
should discount any risky future corn flow using a required rate of
return that is commensurate with corn risk. He explained his reasoning
to his wife in the following way: “Lisa, since the discount rate implied
by the current valuation of everyone’s future risky corn crop is 40%,
then I must use 40% as the discount rate when purchasing risky claims
on future corn.” Mr. Douglas thus valued and evaluated the Haney deal
as follows:
?

NPV ( Mr.Haney ' s Deal ) =

0.5 (150 ) + 0.5 ( 30 )
− 60
1.40

?

= 64.29 − 60
?

= 4.29
“We’re rich, Lisa. With this deal, we can turn that scoundrel Haney
into a money pump. He thinks the deal is only worth 60, when in fact
it is worth 64.29.” So Mr. Douglas entered the deal and paid Mr. Haney
60 bushels of corn. Mr. Haney then went straight to Drucker’s market
and bought back the future corn allotment he had just sold to Mr.
Douglas. See the table above.
Mr. Haney’s wealth today increased by 3.75 while his future wealth
remained the same. In other words, Mr. Haney became richer by
exactly 3.75. But this is a zero-sum deal – whatever Mr. Haney makes,
Mr. Douglas loses. So contrary to what Mr. Douglas believes, Mr.
Haney has actually gotten the better end of this deal. The true value of
the deal to Mr. Douglas is –3.75, and not +4.29. Where did Mr. Douglas
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make an error?
What Mr. Douglas didn’t realize is that the deal he bought from Mr.
Haney does not have the same risk as the overall corn market. The fact
that Mr. Haney made money at Mr. Douglas’ expense tells us that Mr.
Douglas overvalued the deal – in other words, the discount rate that Mr.
Douglas used was too low. How can this be true? What should have
been the right discount rate?
To answer these questions, we need to start with an easier one: in
what situations would it be correct for Mr. Douglas to use 40% as the
discount rate on risky corn deals?
First, we’ve already established that 40% is the correct discount rate
to use on the corn crop as a whole (i.e., on aggregate consumption). If
Mr. Douglas prices his original future endowment using a 40% discount
rate, there are no arbitrage profits available:

DCF Value ( Endowment ) =

0.5 ( 200 ) + 0.5 ( 80 )
= 100
1.40

State − Price Value ( Endowment ) = 200 ⋅ ( 0.25 ) + 80 ⋅ ( 0.625 ) = 100
Suppose Mr. Douglas were to sell one-half of his future endowment
(100 bushels of corn in the banner crop state, and 40 in the poor crop
state). Does a 40% discount rate work? The valuation of this risky corn
deal using DCF is

DCF Value ( Mr.Douglas ' Deal ) =

0.5 (100 ) + 0.5 ( 40 )
= 50
1.40

and the value of an equivalent deal in at Drucker’s market is

State − Price Value ( Mr.Douglas ' Deal ) = 100 ⋅ ( 0.25 ) + 40 ⋅ ( 0.625 )
= 50.
So 40% is the correct discount rate for this particular deal.
Now suppose the Bradley sisters (Billy Jo, Bobby Jo and Betty Jo)
want to pool their future endowments and sell them to Uncle Joe (a total
of 600 banner-state bushels and 240 poor-state bushels). Would the 40%
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TABLE 4.
State-Contingent
Deal Payoff
Eb’s Endowment
Bradley Sisters’ Deal
Mr. Douglas’ Deal
Arnold Ziffle’s Deal
Mr. Haney’s Deal

Bushels Required in
Tracking Portfolio

‘Banner’

‘Poor’

‘Banner’

‘Poor’

200
600
100
–200
150

80
240
40
–80
30

200
600
100
–200
150

80
240
40
–80
30

Ratio
Banner:Poor
2.5 : 1
2.5 : 1
2.5 : 1
2.5 : 1
5.0 : 1

discount rate give an arbitrage-proof price? The DCF valuation would
be

DCF Value ( Bradley Sisters ' Deal ) =

0.5 ( 3 × 200 ) + 0.5 ( 3 × 80 )
1.40

= 300.
One could re-create the same future corn flows at Drucker’s market at
a cost of

State − Price Value ( Bradley Sisters ' Deal ) = 3 × 200 ⋅ ( 0.25 ) + 3
× 80 ⋅ ( 0.625 ) = 300
They are the same; hence the DCF at 40% again gives the right answer.
The reason as to why 40% is the right discount rate on all of these
deals is critical but subtle. Each of these deals can be re-created by
trading, at Drucker’s market, in the right quantities of banner-crop corn
and poor crop corn. While the total quantities of each differ, there is
one constant across all of these deals: the ratio of banner-state corn to
poor state corn in the tracking portfolio is 2.5:1. The table above makes
this clear.
“The” proper risk-adjusted discount rate for a new opportunity is the
market’s priced rate of return on the tracking portfolio that exactly
mimics that opportunity. For any new opportunity x that promises xbanner
bushels of corn in the banner state and xpoor bushels of corn in the poor

56

Multinational Finance Journal

state, the proper tracking portfolio contains xbanner bushels of banner
state corn and xpoor bushels of poor state corn, so the current price of the
tracking portfolio (and the deal) is Px = xbanner · φbanner + xpoor ·φpoor. The
expected future value of this tracking portfolio is E{x} = πbanner · xbanner
+ πpoor ·xpoor, and thus the expected return on the tracking portfolio is

E { x} − Px π banner ⋅ xbanner + π poor ⋅ x poor
=
− 1 = rx
Px
xbanner ⋅ φbanner + x poor ⋅ φ poor
This expected return is the risk-adjusted discount rate for pricing the
new opportunity x by standard DCF pricing

Px =

π banner ⋅ xbanner + π poor ⋅ x poor
1 + rx

and it is easy to show that rx is the same for all deals where the ratio
xbanner / xpoor is the same. In our example, when the ratio xbanner / xpoor =
2.5, the correct discount rate to use to value the opportunity is 40%.10
Mr. Douglas mispriced the Haney deal because the discount rate he
used was not appropriate: the discount rate Mr. Douglas used was
appropriate for risks that mimic the risk of the overall economy, and the
Haney deal has a completely different risk profile (as shown by the 5:1
ratio of its banner-to-poor corn holdings in its arbitrage portfolio). But
we still have not ascertained the right discount rate for the Haney deal.
This takes a little more work, and a little more in the way of general
results.
To give the simplest illustration of a deal whose ratio of cash flows
across states is not equal to the ratio of aggregate consumption across
states, consider Hank Kimball, the county agent. Mr. Kimball is quite
conservative, and he is looking to buy a deal that will deliver him 15
bushels of corn in the future no matter what the crop turns out to be.
The future corn flows on this deal are obviously risk-free, but there is
no risk-free asset available in Hooterville. 40% is clearly not the right
discount rate. But what is?
There’s no way to know without explicitly forming the tracking

10. Notice that 2.5 is the inverse of the state price ratio:
= 2.5.

φpoor / φbanner = 0.625 / 0.25
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portfolio first. This is the general problem with valuation of derivatives
and assets with derivative-like payoffs (like forward contracts and like
Mr. Haney’s deal): DCF would work if you know the correct discount
rate, but there is no way to know the right discount rate without
knowing the tracking portfolio (and hence the value of the derivative)
in the first place. To value derivatives, we have to rely on a different
approach to linear pricing – we create a portfolio of existing claims
from the financial markets that exactly replicate the payoff on the
derivative; the value of that package of claims is the value of the
derivative. If that sounds to you like the way we described DCF above,
then you are paying attention. DCF and option pricing methodology are
built on the same foundation – linear pricing in an arbitrage-free
financial market – and hence rely on the same underlying assumptions
– no arbitrage opportunities in financial markets (and, if we are applying
the NPV rule inside a firm, price-taking by managers).
The financial market price of the deal Mr. Kimball desires is 13.125.
This can be seen through the simple exercise of buying 15 bushels of
banner-state corn at 0.25 each and 15 bushels of poor-state corn at 0.625
each:

State − Price Value ( Mr. Kimball ' s Deal ) = 15 ⋅ ( 0.25) + 15 ⋅ ( 0.625 )
= 13.125
This is the arbitrage-free price of the risk-free claim. Hence, we can
derive the correct discount rate to use on deals proportional to Mr.
Kimball’s:

DCF Value ( Mr. Kimball ' s Deal ) =

0.5 (15 ) + 0.5 (15)
15
=
1 + rF
(1 + rKimball )

= 13.125 so rF = 14.3%
The appropriate discount rate for Mr. Kimball’s deal, as well as any
other deal where the ratio of banner-state payoff to poor-state payoff is
1:1, is 14.3%. This is because the expected return on the tracking
portfolio that exactly mimics this deal is 14.3%.
So this takes us back to Mr. Haney’s deal. Remember, Mr. Haney
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offered Mr. Douglas 150 banner-state bushels of corn and 30 poor-state
bushels of corn. Mr. Haney’s deal is a derivative; it is actually a
European call option on his entire future endowment with strike price
equal to 50. The payoff on this deal is not invariant to the future state,
so the risk-free rate is not the appropriate discount rate. Moreover,
these payments are not proportional to aggregate consumption, so 40%
is not the correct discount rate. So what is the correct discount rate to
use to value Mr. Haney’s deal?
Mr. Haney’s deal can be replicated in the financial markets by
buying 150 bushels of banner-state corn at a cost of 0.25/bushel, and 30
bushels of poor-state corn at a cost of 0.625/bushel. So the present
value of Mr. Haney’s deal (the price which gives it a zero NPV) is

State − Price Value ( Mr. Haney ' s Deal ) = 150 ⋅ ( 0.25 ) + 30 ⋅ ( 0.625 )
= 37.5 + 18.75 = 56.25
If the deal can be purchased for less than this, the purchaser has found
a positive NPV opportunity. Mr. Douglas, on the other hand, paid 60 for
the deal – a negative NPV investment!
Now that we know the value of Mr. Haney’s deal, we can calculate
the discount rate that would have given us the correct answer:

DCF Value ( Mr. Haney ' s Deal ) =

0.5 (150 ) + 0.5 ( 30 )
1 + rMr . Haney

= 56.25 so rMr . Haney = 60%
The right discount rate to use on Mr. Haney’s deal is 60% - much higher
than the pure rate of interest on corn. This correct discount rate
provides Mr. Douglas’ true NPV from entering Mr. Haney’s Deal:

NPV ( Mr. Haney ' s Deal @ 60% ) =

0.5 (150 ) + 0.5 ( 30 )
− 60
1.60

= 56.25 − 60 = −3.75
which shows that the value destruction caused to Mr. Douglas by
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entering Mr. Haney’s deal is exactly the same as Mr. Haney’s arbitrage
profits from selling (shorting) the deal.
You might be wondering why the discount rate on Mr. Haney’s deal
is so high. This is a standard result in finance: Mr. Haney’s deal is a
call option on his future corn endowment (with a strike price of 50), and
call options are always riskier than the underlying asset on which they
are written. This is often explained to students as a leverage effect,
because the hedge portfolio that mimics the option is a levered position
in the underlying asset. But the story is much deeper.
To see why derivatives have different risk from their underlying
assets in general, it is necessary to look at two very special derivatives.
The “Banner Crop Special” pays off 1 bushel of corn in the banner crop
state and nothing in the poor crop state, while the “Poor Crop Special”
pays off 1 bushel of corn in the poor crop state and nothing in the
banner crop state.11

State − Price Value ( Banner Crop Special ) = 0.25 (1) + 0.625 ( 0 )

= 0.25
DCF Value ( Banner Crop Special ) =

0.5 (1) + 0.5 ( 0 )
1 + rBanner

= 0.25 so rBanner = 100%
State − Price Value ( Poor Crop Special ) = 0.25 ( 0 ) + 0.625 (1)
= 0.625
DCF Value ( Poor Crop Special ) =

0.5 ( 0 ) + 0.5 (1)
1 + rPoor

= 0.625 so rPoor = −20%
11. The “Banner State Special” is a call on someone’s future endowment at a strike price
of 199, while the “Poor State Special” is a put on the same endowment with a strike price of
81.
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FIGURE 5.
The participants at Drucker’s market impose a very high discount rate
on the Banner Crop Special, and a negative discount rate on the Poor
Crop Special. Why? One of the important results from microeconomics
is that marginal utility of consumption is highest when total
consumption is lowest. In other words, people value an additional unit
of consumption in the low-endowment state (the poor crop state) much
more highly than they do in the high-endowment state (the banner crop
state), so when markets open at Drucker’s, the price of the Poor Crop
Special comes out higher than the price of the Banner Crop Special
even though they have the exact same expected payoff (0.5 bushels of
future corn).12 In this economy, people value consumption in the poor
crop state so much that the price of the Poor Crop Special is above its
expected payoff (and hence is being discounted at a negative discount
rate). The Poor Crop Special is actually an insurance contract that
insures the buyer against the poor consumption state, and the fact that
risk-averse people are willing to pay a price higher than expected value
for an insurance contract is the economic reason that the insurance
industry exists.
Note what else this means: each future state of nature has its own
12. This is not a trick. As long as aggregate consumption is different across the two
states, risk-averse individuals in the economy will wish to hedge against the low-consumption
state and will value consumption in such a way that, in equilibrium, φbanner / πbanner < φpoor /
πpoor (or, in technical terms, the pricing kernel or state-price density is decreasing in
consumption).
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unique discount rate. When the ratio of payoffs across states for a new
deal is equal to the ratio of aggregate consumption across states, then
the aggregated discount rate of 40% is appropriate; however, when
flows from a deal are more heavily weighted towards one of the states,
then the market-wide rate of 40% is not appropriate. The figure above
shows how discount rates change as the ratio of banner-state payoff to
poor-state payoff varies.
This is the real reason that call options (like the Haney deal) are
priced at such a high discount rate – their payoffs are realized in
high-discount rate states. In other words, they increase the individual’s
exposure to aggregate consumption risk, and hence are considered very
risky.
F. A More Familiar Approach: Risk-Neutral Probabilities
At this point, you may be questioning our interpretation of options in
the simple economy and you might think that textbook approaches to
option valuation won’t get the same answers. We’ll show that this is
not the case. The familiar binomial option pricing model of Cox, Ross
and Rubenstein (1979), which gives the famous Black-Scholes (1973)
model in the limit as time steps become small and the number of steps
become large, gives the exact same results that we’ve just derived.
The Hooterville economy is easy to place in a binomial framework.
Just let aggregate consumption be the nodes of the binomial tree above.
The percentage change in consumption in the banner crop state (i.e.
the size of the ‘up’ step in the binomial model) is (200N/100N) – 1 =
+100%; similarly, the percentage change in consumption in the poor
crop state (i.e. the size of the ‘down’ step in the binomial model) is
(80N/100N) – 1 = –20%. Remembering that the risk-free payoff can be
achieved by buying Mr. Kimball’s deal above, and that the market price
of this deal implied a risk-free rate of return of 14.3%, we can calculate
the familiar risk-neutral probability for this economy:

q=

r − d 0.143 − ( −0.20 )
=
= 0.286
u − d 1.00 − ( −0.20 )

The risk-neutral probability q, along with the risk-free discount rate,
prices all assets (including derivatives) in this economy using the
risk–neutral probability approach to linear pricing (here in the form of
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Today

Banner State

Future

Percentage Change

200N

+100%

80N

-20%

100N
Poor State

FIGURE 6.
the binomial model):

Risk − Netural Probability Value =
q ⋅ ( payoff in banner state ) + (1 − q )( payoff in poor state )
1 + rF
For example, Eb Dawson’s Future Endowment:

Risk − Netural Probability Value ( Ed ' s Future Endowment ) =
0.286 ( 200 ) + 0.714 ( 80 )
= 100
1.143
which is the exact answer we got before. Or, Mr. Haney’s Deal:

Risk − Netural Probability Value ( Mr. Haney ' s Deal ) =
0.286 (150 ) + 0.714 ( 30 )
= 56.25
1.143
again, precisely the same answer as before. The risk-neutral pricing
model will price any asset in the economy properly. The reason is
direct: risk-neutral probabilities are simply an alternative (but
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equivalent) expression of the linear pricing result. If the financial
market allows no arbitrage opportunities, then there exists a set of
risk-neutral probabilities such that the risk-neutral pricing model (i.e.,
expected future cash flows calculated using the risk–neutral
probabilities and then discounted at the risk-free rate of return) prices
all assets in the economy.
To see the equivalence, note that we can re-arrange the risk-neutral
probability model valuation equation and get something very similar:

Risk − Netural Probability Value =
q
1− q
( Payoff in Banner State ) +
( Payoff in Poor State )
1 + rF
1 + rF
Using Mr. Haney’s deal again as the example:

Risk − Netural Probability Value ( Mr. Haney ' s Deal ) =
0.286
0.714
(150 ) +
( 30 ) = 0.25 (150 ) + 0.625 ( 30 ) = 56.25
1.143
1.143
The similarity between the state-price valuation of Mr. Haney’s deal and
the risk-neutral probability valuation of the same deal should strike you,
because
q
1− q
= φBanner and
= φ poor
1 + rF
1 + rF
(check for yourself!). The famous risk-neutral probabilities from option
pricing (the N(d2) terms in the Black-Scholes model) are actually prices
for state securities scaled by the risk-free return factor: q = (1+rF) φBanner,
and 1 – q = (1+rF) φPoor.
G. Yet Another Approach to Linear Pricing
As we just discussed, the state price representation of the linear pricing
result in Hooterville is
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State − Price Value = φBanner ⋅ ( Payoff in Banner State )
+φPoor ( Payoff in Poor State )
If we define two new quantities ρbanner and ρpoor as follows:

ρbanner =

φbanner
π banner

and

ρ poor =

φ poor
π poor

and then substitute these new quantities into the state price
representation of the linear pricing rule, we get what is known as the
state price density representation of the linear pricing rule:

State − Price Density Value = π banner ρbanner cbanner + π poor ρ poor c poor
= E { ρ c}
ρ is often called the pricing kernel or state price deflator, and it
measures priced scarcity of consumption. Its existence in an
arbitrage-free financial market is derived via a mathematical result
known as the Riesz Representation Theorem, and so this linear pricing
approach is sometimes referred to as a Riesz Representation.
A proof that each of the linear pricing representations is both
necessary and sufficient for the others can be found in Dybvig and Ross
(2003).
I. A Note About Complete Markets
There is substantial misunderstanding about the term complete markets.
The first misunderstanding involves what states need to be hedged. The
true requirement is that, for every possible aggregate consumption state,
there exists some portfolio or portfolio strategy that pays off exactly one
if that state occurs and exactly zero otherwise. This does not mean that
there needs to be a way to hedge against any future contingency – the
only contingencies that need to be hedged for markets to be complete
are states that are defined by aggregate consumption (because those are
the only risks that are priced).
It is important to note here that firm-specific, idiosyncratic outcomes
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do not constitute states of nature. The systematic portion of an asset’s
risk is described by the asset’s expected payoff in each macroeconomic
state; potential deviations from these expected payoffs in each state are
idiosyncratic and thus diversifiable. If every macroeconomic aggregate
consumption state can be identified with a state security, then the
systematic risk of any new opportunity can be exactly replicated with
the state securities. Perfect tracking is not essential for valuation of any
sort (DCF, option pricing, or whatever) – all we need is for our tracking
portfolio to have an expected error of zero in each possible
macroeconomic state of nature.
The second misunderstanding is the widespread belief that there
needs to be a single traded security for every possible future
consumption state. This is not true. All that is needed is a way to create
state securities (see Ross, 1976), and trading in primary securities
allows markets to be complete. So when intertemporal trading is
allowed, the number of securities needed to complete the market can be
very small. In fact, Duffie and Huang (1985) show that if aggregate
consumption follows a geometric Brownian motion process, then the
market can be completed by trading in a grand total of two securities.
This turns out to be the reason that people insist on assuming that the
underlying asset be tradable in order to price options – because the
tradability assumption is actually equivalent to a market completeness
assumption. If we assume that the underlying asset and a risk-free bond
are continuously tradable, then over any very short time interval a
binomial model exists and the market is necessarily complete (two
states, two assets). So as perverse as it sounds, many people reject the
market completeness assumption – and then proceed to make it anyway
through the tradability assumption.

V. Summary and Conclusion
First, maximization of shareholder value (defined as using financial
market prices to determine values of new opportunities via the financial
market’s linear pricing rule) is the appropriate goal of management if
and only if,
(1) The financial markets are free of arbitrage opportunities, and
(2) Managers act as price takers, which requires that
(a) The financial markets are sufficiently complete,
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(b) The new investment does not affect aggregate consumption
in a material way.
Second, if these conditions are met, valuation of corporate
opportunities using any representation of the market’s linear pricing rule
(whether it be DCF, a tracking portfolio approach, or any of the others)
are equally valid: absence of arbitrage alone assures that a linear pricing
rule exists, and price taking assumes that the cash flows from any new
corporate asset are linearly related to the cash flows on existing
securities.
We’d like to put it one final way. DCF analysis of an illiquid new
capital investment is an application of linear pricing, and it requires that
there exists a liquid portfolio of financial market securities which
exactly mimics the state-contingent distribution of cash flows on the
illiquid project. So if there is a liquid portfolio of traded securities that
mimics the project, then one can value options on that liquid portfolio.
Of course, options on that portfolio can be constructed to exactly mimic
options on the illiquid project, so it is entirely appropriate to value
options on the illiquid project even though the project itself can’t be
held in an arbitrage portfolio. Why? Because the tracking portfolio can
be found in the liquid capital markets.
And that brings us full circle. Maximization of shareholder value is
applicable only when markets are arbitrage free and managers are price
takers, and when these conditions are met then managers can use option
pricing to value new propositions in the same way (and for the same
reasons) that they can use DCF. And thus the point of this paper: if
you are willing to make the assumptions necessary to perform a DCF
analysis on an illiquid new corporate investment and let NPV be the
decision rule for managers, you have already made all the assumptions
necessary for application of option pricing techniques to corporate
investments.
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Appendix: Derivation of the Pure-Exchange Equilibria
A. Equilibrium Prices in the World of Certainty
The consumer’s optimization problem is
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max{c0 , c1} U ( c0 , c1 )
s.t. c0 + φ1c1 = y0 + φ1 y1
From the Lagrangian

l = U ( c0 , c1 ) − λ ( c0 + φ1c1 − y0 − φ1 y1 )
the first-order conditions are

∂l ∂U
=
−λ =0
∂c0 ∂c0
∂l ∂U
=
− λφ1 = 0.
∂c1 ∂c1
Clearing the Lagrangian multiplier,

∂c1 1
= .
∂c0 φ1
Taking the total differential of the utility function

dU =

∂U
∂U
dc0 +
dc1
∂c0
∂c1

so along any utility isoquant (where dU = 0 )

dc1
∂U ∂c0
.
=−
dc0 U
∂U ∂c1
Evaluating the terms,

∂U 1
=
∂c0 c0
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∂U 1
=
∂c1 c1
so

dc1
c
∂U ∂c0
=−
= − 1.
dc0 U
c0
∂U ∂c1
Additionally,

dc1
∂U ∂c0
∂c
1
=−
=− 1 =−
dc0 U
φ1
∂U ∂c1
∂c0
so

−

c1 1
=
c0 φ1

or φ1 =

c0
.
c1

Since it is a pure-exchange economy, individuals must hold their
endowments in equilibrium so

φ1 =

100
= 0.714.
140

B. Equilibrium Prices in the World of Uncertainty
The consumer’s optimization problem is

max{c0 ,cbanner ,c poor } U ( c0 , cbanner , c poor )
s.t. c0 + φbanner cbanner + φ poor c poor = y0 + φbanner ybanner + φ poor y poor .
From the Lagrangian

l = U ( c0 , cbanner , c poor ) − λ ( c0 + φbanner cbanner + φ poor c poor − y0
−φbanner ybanner − φ poor y poor )
the first-order conditions are
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∂l ∂U
=
−λ =0
∂c0 ∂c0
∂l
∂cbanner

=

∂U
− λφbanner = 0
∂cbanner

∂l
∂U
=
− λφ poor = 0.
∂c poor ∂c poor
Along the isoutility curve,

∂cbanner
1
=−
φbanner
∂c0
∂c poor
∂c0

=−

1

φ poor

.

In our problem,

∂U 1
=
∂c0 c0
∂U
0.5
=
∂cbanner cbanner
∂U
0.5
, so
=
∂c poor c poor
−

1

φbanner
−

=

1

φ poor

∂cbanner
∂U ∂c0
1 c0
c
=−
=−
= − banner
0.5 cbanner U
0.5c0 U
∂c0 U
∂U ∂cbanner U

=

∂c poor
c
1 c0
∂U ∂c0
=−
=−
= − poor .
∂c0 U
∂U ∂c poor U
0.5 c poor U
0.5c0 U

Since all of the individuals have identical beliefs, preferences,
endowments and productive opportunities (none), the corn market must

70

Multinational Finance Journal

establish a set of prices such that each individual is satisfied to hold his
or her original endowment. Evaluating the above at c0 = y0; cbanner =
ybanner; cpoor = ypoor, we find the equilibrium prices

−

−

1

φbanner
1

φ poor

=−

=−

cbanner
y
200
= − banner = −
= −4 so φbanner = 0.25
0.5c0 U
0.5 y0 U
0.5 (100 )

c poor
y
80
= − poor = −
= −1.6 so φ poor = 0.625.
0.5c0 U
0.5 y0 U
0.5 (100 )
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